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rms and of venture capitalists to 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1 Introduction
Among new entrepreneurial rms in high-technology industries, venture capital (VC) has
increasingly become an important player, not only as a source of nance but also as a
source of professional support. The rms transition from birth of the idea to a mar-
ketable and protable product not only involves technological experiments and develop-
ment of prototypes. Acquiring new facilities, developing marketing strategies, attracting
key clients and reliable suppliers, hiring new personnel, team building, and raising further
nancing to expand the business requires formidable managerial expertise and entrepre-
neurial experience. While procient at the technological side, start-up entrepreneurs not
only lack the necessary capital but are also in dire need of professional assistance. Sea-
soned venture capitalists (VCs) are well suited to ll these gaps. They have good access to
capital, are endowed with own managerial experience and detailed knowledge of the indus-
try, and can count on a well developed network of suppliers, customers and key personnel.
Indeed, the dening characteristic of VC is the combination of nance and commercial
assistance. In contrast to passive bank nancing, VCs arrange for entrepreneurs to receive
support in various ways: they create links to suppliers and possible customers; they get
hold of key personnel; they provide strategic and marketing advice, etc.
Venture capital started out in the U.S. some four decades ago and has vigorously
grown in the last twenty years. By now, almost half of new rms which are sold o¤
at IPOs (Initial Public O¤erings) have been backed by VC (see Gompers and Lerner,
2001). In Europe, the introduction of VC started signicantly later, and only in the
most recent years have VC rms become prominent nanciers of young technology-rms.
Recent statistics published by EVCA (the European Private Equity and Venture Capital
Association) report a total investment by members of the Association of 29.1 billion Euros
in 2003.1 Like in previous years, strict seed and start-up investment constituted a minor
part of the total amount (some 2.2 billion Euros or 7.4 pct.), the rest being expansion-
stage investment and nancing of buyouts etc. The EVCA statistics further reveal marked
1See the EVCA Press Release on EVCA Final Figures for 2003, June 3, 2004.
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di¤erences across countries. The UK, Sweden and France have the relatively largest
Private Equity/VC industries in Europe, several times larger than those of countries like
Denmark and Austria.
Young entrepreneurial rms are considered an important source of innovation and em-
ployment. Policy makers and the business community have thus taken a strong interest in
healthy conditions for nancing new rms, and in the development of an active VC indus-
try in particular. Several important questions arise when developing a policy perspective.
Is there enough risk capital available? Do administrative procedures and requirements
hinder entrepreneurship in the rst place? Are government grants and subsidies to new
rms appropriate? Do taxes block the creation and development of start-ups? The VC
industry itself surely considers public policy to be relevant and keeps an eye on whether
the general policy environment is suitable to promote the development of private equity
and venture capital and to encourage entrepreneurship. For instance, EVCA in 2003 and
again in 2004 published a benchmarking report on the tax and legal environment in its
member countries (cfr. EVCA, 2004).2 The assessment evaluates 13 indicators relating
to both the supply-side (i.e. investors in private equity and VC funds and fund managers
investing directly in companies) and the demand-side of private equity and VC (i.e cre-
ation of entrepreneurial rms). Among the tax indicators covered are (i) company tax
rates, with special attention to those applicable to small and medium-sized companies; (ii)
capital gains tax rates for individuals; (iii) income tax rates for private individuals; (iv)
tax incentives for individual investors investing in private equity; (v) the entrepreneurial
environment; and (vi) scal incentives to enhance research and development.
The benchmarking report dened a favorable tax environment by the following criteria
(points 3.6 to 3.9 and 3.11 on p. 7 in the report): (i) Company tax rates, especially
for small and medium sized enterprises should help to support entrepreneurship. (ii) A
favorable tax treatment of the sale of unquoted investments in growth companies is an
appropriate incentive to entrepreneurial investment. (iii) Income tax rates for private
2See also the related Press Release from EVCA of May 24, 2004.
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individuals should support, attract and retain human capital, in particular entrepreneurs,
researchers and highly qualied company managers. (iv) Tax incentives should be adopted
for individual investors investing in private equity funds. (v) Fiscal R & D incentives
should be adopted.
The benchmarking report can only be taken to reect a rm belief in taxes mattering
for entrepreneurship. Many empirical contributions to public nance do indeed testify
to the general importance of taxes for entrepreneurship. For example, Rosen (2004) in
summarizing his research with a series of co-authors produces ample evidence that once
started, the decisions in new rms regarding employment, capital investment and produc-
tion are markedly inuenced by taxes. Gentry and Hubbards (2000) empirical analysis
demonstrates that the progressivity of the tax schedule is important for entrepreneurship,
while Cullen and Gordon (2002) nd that lower personal income taxes in fact reduce
entrepreneurship because of the lower tax value of o¤setting losses.
Besides this general literature on entrepreneurship there is little theoretical or empir-
ical work on the e¤ects of public policies on VC nanced entrepreneurship. Exceptions
are a couple of contributions by Poterba (1989a,b) and Gompers and Lerner (1998) which
investigate how capital gains taxation a¤ects the demand for VC via entrepreneursca-
reer choice and the supply of VC in terms of funds raised. Further, our own previous
theoretical work has aimed to shed light on the relation between taxes and VC-backed
entrepreneurship (see Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004a-b, and Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003a-b,
2004a-b).
The present chapter investigates selected taxes and subsidies such as those emphasized
by the EVCA benchmarking report mentioned above, and explores how they impact on
VC nanced entrepreneurship. In particular, we examine a subsidy to start-up investment
representing the various investment grants, interest subsidies, subsidies to capital expen-
diture in research and development which are prevalent in many countries. We explore
the taxation of capital gains in new rms when sold o¤ to new investors, the taxation of
wages in occupations alternative to the pursuit of an entrepreneurial career, and corporate
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income taxation. Although the corporation tax is paid mainly by more mature rms with
positive prots, it is nevertheless rather crucial to start-ups as well since it is capitalized
in rm value and thereby a¤ects the price at which successful new rms can be sold o¤
after the start-up phase.
Our primary focus is on the consequences of taxes and subsidies on the rate of business
creation and the quality of VC nancing in industry equilibrium. We set up a two-period
equilibrium model that is rich enough to reveal the e¤ects of taxes and subsidies on as
well the survival probability of start-ups, IPO prices and capital investment of mature
rms, as welfare. The core of the model is the relationship between a nance-constrained
entrepreneur and a VC rm that must pay for the new rms physical investment ex-
penses. The rms success rests on the entrepreneurs e¤ort and due diligence, as is well
established in the empirical literature (such as that reviewed in Rosen, 2004). It also
reects the VCs engagement and contribution to the rm as argued above (see Kaplan
and Stromberg, 2001, for a concise statement of the stylized facts) and empirically docu-
mented by Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002), among many
others. The empirical evidence on VC value added in Europe is more controversial (see
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002, for a skeptical view. Audretsch and Lehmann, 2003, arrive
at a more positive picture).
It seems that the productive contribution of VCs to business growth is not a guaranteed
matter and may rest on the existence of appropriate incentives on the part of VCs. Finance
theory has addressed these incentives in terms of a double-sided moral hazard problem,
where both the entrepreneur and VC must exert e¤ort in the company (see Holmstrom,
1982; Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Casamatta, 2003; Inderst and Mueller, 2004; Repullo
and Suarez, 2004; Schmidt, 2003; and our own previous work mentioned above). Since
neither partys e¤ort is observable and contractible, the VC contract must be carefully
crafted to provide appropriate incentives to both the entrepreneur and VC. In focussing on
the real e¤ects of VC in industry equilibrium, we postulate a particularly simple model
of the entrepreneurs and VCs interaction that gives rise to a simple Pareto-optimal
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contract that can be implemented by a straight equity contract. Although real world VC
contracts contain many additional elements such as staging, control rights and convertible
securities, these non-monetary incentives may be considered more like complements rather
than substitutes to the incentives provided in a nancial contract (see Hart, 2001).
Within our simple model, the contract species that the VC acquires an equity stake
for a price that covers at least the physical start-up costs plus possibly an upfront payment
to the entrepreneur. The agreed prot sharing is chosen to optimally allocate incentives to
the entrepreneur and VC in order to maximize the joint surplus to be divided among them.
Although prot sharing is optimally chosen, it nevertheless implies that each party is able
to appropriate only a share of the marginal gains from putting forth extra e¤ort while
she will have to bear the entire private cost of doing so. For this reason, entrepreneurial
e¤ort and VC advice tend to be too low compared to a socially e¢ cient allocation.
No such distortion is present in our model with respect to the rate of business creation.
The literature has indeed been very skeptical towards policies that simply aim to promote
the rate of business creation. In fact, it often argues for a tax rather than a subsidy to entry
(cfr. De Meza, 2002; see also the discussion in Cressy, 2002, and Parker, 2003). From
a normative point of view, our model does not support policies to accelerate business
creation either but rather argues for a better quality of start-ups. It supports policies
that do not aim at more but rather more successful rms VC backed rms. There is a
quality-quantity trade-o¤.
Most real world policies towards young rms subsidize the cost of capital from start-
up investment. Policy analysis within our model shows that these subsidies are indeed
e¤ective in stimulating entrepreneurship but are questionable from a broader welfare
perspective. Precisely because they are e¤ective in generating entry, they tend to depress
market prices and rm values which ultimately erodes the rewards to private e¤ort. Since
e¤ort is too low in private equilibrium, these subsidies tend to reduce welfare. Capital
gains taxes have an ambiguous e¤ect on entrepreneurship while they may be quite harmful
in welfare terms. Wage taxes lead individuals into entrepreneurial careers, but likewise
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may be unwarranted from a welfare angle. Instead, taxes on entrepreneurs would be more
sensible, leading to fewer but more successful and more valuable rms. Finally, corporate
income taxes are likely to a¤ect entrepreneurship negatively since they reduce the value
of mature companies and thereby impair the reward to e¤ort in start-up rms. Very
importantly, this will be the case even if the corporate income tax is of the cash-ow tax
type which is neutral to investment in mature rms. Quite generally, any policy reducing
the value of mature companies will feed back negatively on incentives within start-up
rms. To state our arguments more precisely, we set up an equilibrium model in section
2 and provide a formal policy analysis in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Start-ups and Venture Capital
2.1 Overview
Figure 1 illustrates our two-period model of young and mature rms. The sequence of
events unfolds from left to right. At the beginning of the rst period, the government
denes a policy environment, consisting of the policy instruments listed at the bottom of
the gure. The entrepreneurial and traditional sectors produce a perfectly substitutable
output with a price normalized to unity. Production in the traditional sector is Ricardian,
converting one unit of labor intoW units of output, and thus paying a xed wageW . The
traditional sector absorbs all labor resources not demanded by the entrepreneurial sector.
There is a population of mass one of agents. Weighing the prospects of an entrepreneur-
ial career against employment in the traditional sector at a safe wage W , a mass E of
agents opts for entrepreneurship to pursue their business ideas. The remaining population
(L = 1   E) chooses employment. The occupational choice decision of individuals thus
shifts production to one or the other sector. In the second period, output is supplied by
entrepreneurial rms only, traditional rms being inactive.
An entrepreneur must rst undertake a seed investment to turn her idea into a project
and develop a business plan. For this purpose, individual i needs to incur a non-pecuniary
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investment of hi. Individuals are assumed to di¤er in their basic inventiveness. Some
create their project at low cost while others have to put in more e¤ort. Lacking own
resources to start the rm, an entrepreneur proposes a deal to a VC rm to nance and
advise the venture. When accepting the contract, the VC acquires a share 1   s in the
rm, leaving a share s to the entrepreneur, against a total price B+ (1  z) I that covers
at least the private start-up cost I net of a possible government subsidy z plus an extra
upfront payment B to the entrepreneur. The parameters s and B of the contract are
optimally chosen to reect the relative importance of the expected contribution to the
rms success.
Period 1 Period 2
Occupational
choice
Events:
Prod. f(k)
Dividends
f(k) + k
E Entre-
preneurs1
Policy:
Seed
inv.
Contract
Joint effort
0=
Start-up
investment
I
ih
, Bs
,e a
Start-up
subsidy
z
V
Capital
gains tax
t
IPO
2V 3VDividends
f1 - k
Production f1
t
Corporate
tax
L Workers,
trad.sector
Mature
investment
k
Wt
Wage
tax
t
Corporate
tax
Figure 1: Events and Notation
Having specied the terms of the contract, the rm is started up with the xed in-
vestment I. The venture is risky. Both the entrepreneur and the VC must put in e¤ort
to enhance the rms chances. The likelihood of success is specied as p = p (e; a) and
depends on entrepreneurial e¤ort e and VC advice a. If a venture succeeds, production
starts, and the rm can be sold to new investors, possibly at an IPO, for a price V . If
it fails (with probability 1   p), the rm will be shut down without any production and
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revenues whatsoever. When rms successfully mature to production stage, they produce
f1 for the remainder of the rst period. A part k of this production is retained and
invested internally to accumulate capital, while the residual is distributed as dividends
to owners. In the second period, production f (k) is continued at a level depending on
mature rm investment k. Revenues are paid out to owners. The capital stock k is
assumed to depreciate in full over the second period. Depending on the level of wages
or entrepreneurial income received, individuals save in the rst period to choose optimal
life-cycle consumption.
The policy instruments to be investigated are: tW a tax on wage income; t a corporate
income tax on mature rms;  a capital gains tax on new rms, levied symmetrically on
entrepreneurs and VCs; and z a subsidy to start-up investment. A fraction , 0    1,
of mature rm investment k can be expensed in the rst period from the corporate income
tax, even though capital only depreciates in the second period. The remaining part 1  
is deducted from the tax base in the second period. Government budget imbalances are
o¤set with a lump-sum taxes or transfers, where T1 and T2 denote the lump-sum payments
in the two periods. The next subsections solve the model by backward induction, in the
reverse order of Figure 1, and starts with intertemporal consumption choice, given income
as determined by earlier events.
2.2 Consumption and Savings
A simple specication of preferences for present and future consumption, X i and Di, is
given by U i = X i+ u (Di)  li, where li is e¤ort of agent i, depending on her occupation.
E¤ort of workers is normalized to zero. When consumption is decided upon, e¤ort on the
part of entrepreneurs is already sunk and income depending on success or failure is given.
Denoting by yi discounted individual income, intertemporal consumption follows from
Ui = max

X i + u
 
Di
  li s:t: X i +Di=R  yi	 ; (1)
where r denotes the rate of interest and R = 1 + r the discount factor.
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Ownership of VC rms is broadly dispersed over the population. Everyone thus re-
ceives VC prots equal to  per capita. At the end of period 1, a worker has wealth
(present value of income) yi =
 
1  tW W +T +, where T stands for the present value
of government transfers, T = T1+ T2=R, and tW is a proportional wage tax. A successful
entrepreneur has a wealth of yi = (1  ) (sV +B) + T + , while a less fortunate one
is left with yi = (1  )B + T +  only. When selling the share 1   s to the VC at
the beginning of period at a price (1  z) I + B, she realizes a capital gain on the initial
investment (1  z) I. At IPO, she realizes a further capital gain sV , and pays a capital
gains tax at rate  . An unsuccessful entrepreneur receives no further capital gains.
Given separable preferences, consumption and savings follow from u0 (Di) = 1=R. All
agents thus demand the same amount of second period consumption, with D0 (R) > 0.
Savings are thus identical as well. Income heterogeneity simply leads to di¤erent levels of
present consumption. Indirect utility results upon substituting out X i in (1),
Ui = yi   li + C (R) ; C (R)  u (D) D=R: (2)
Welfare of an individual agent equals life-time wealth adjusted for e¤ort cost plus consumer
surplus C(R) which, by construction, is uniform across agents.
2.3 Mature Firm Value and Investment
A mature rm is assumed to pay net of tax dividends 1 = (1  t) f1   (1  t) k and
2 = (1  t) f (k) + (1  ) tk, where f1 is a xed amount of rst period output and f (k)
is a standard production function. A part  of mature rm investment is immediately
expensed against the corporation tax; the remaining part reduces the tax bill next period.
This denition of dividends assumes internal investment nance. At IPO, the value V of
a mature rm reects the present value of the net dividend ows 1 and 2. Paying out
a dividend 1 at the end of period one leaves a value V2 at the beginning of period 2. In
period 2, another dividend of 2 is paid out, leaving a value of V3 = 0 at the end of the
period, when the world ends. Therefore, from the date of IPO to the end of period 2,
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mature rms run down their value to zero on account of dividend payments. No-arbitrage
conditions nail down rm values V and V2 in capital market equilibrium,
0 = 1 + (V2   V ) ; rV2 = 2   V2: (3)
The rst equation states that the sum of dividends and (negative) capital gains must be
zero in the latter part of the rst period since interest is zero within period. During the
second period, dividends and net-of-tax capital losses must add up to a rate of return that
matches the interest r from an alternative investment of V2. Substituting the dividend
denitions in these no-arbitrage conditions yields V2 = 2=R and V = 1+V2 = 1+2=R
which is rearranged as
V = (1  t) f1 + V1; V1 = (1  t) [f (k)  uk]
R
; u  (1  t)R  (1  ) t
1  t : (4)
The part V1 is that part of rm value which is optimized with respect to mature rm
investment. First note how interest and tax parameters a¤ect the user cost of capital,
du
dR
=
1  t
1  t ;
du
dt
=
(1  ) r
(1  t)2 ;
du
d
=   t
1  tr: (5)
Maximizing with respect to mature rm investment k yields
f 0 (k) = u ) dk
dR
< 0;
dk
dt
 0; dk
d
> 0: (6)
Since the corporate income tax raises the cost of capital, it reduces mature rm invest-
ment. If  = 1, however, so that capital investment can be immediately expensed, the
corporate income tax becomes a cash ow tax, neutral to investment (presuming a pos-
itive corporate income tax). An increase in the rate of immediate investment expensing
promotes investment if the tax rate is positive. Finally, a rise in the interest rate tends
to lower investment in mature rms.
Using the envelope theorem, the e¤ects of taxes on mature rm values are
dV
dR
=  V1 + (1  t) k
R
;
dV
d
= t
rk
R
;
dV
dt
=   V
1  t ;    1 +
(1  ) rk
RV
: (7)
The IPO value will be negatively a¤ected by increases in both the corporate income
tax and the interest rate, while a rise in the expensing parameter stimulates rm value
provided that the corporate tax is positive.
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2.4 VC Financed Start-ups
An entrepreneurs expected surplus is the utility di¤erence between entrepreneurship and
employment and reects not only income di¤erences but also various e¤ort costs. First,
seed investment is interpreted as a non-pecuniary private research e¤ort which is required
to prepare a business plan. Agents are taken to be distributed uniformly in the unit
interval with respect to research ability and associated e¤ort cost, hi = h  i. Once this
e¤ort is sunk, all start-up rms are assumed to be of uniform quality which cuts out any
issues of adverse selection and helps to concentrate on the double moral hazard in VC
backed rms. This is not to deny that selection e¤ects are important, but only helps to
focus on the value added role of VCs.3
A start-up succeeds with probability p, leaving a value of V , and fails with 1   p,
leaving nothing. By the law of large numbers with independent risks, the number of
mature rms becomes N = pE. The success probability p = p (e; a) is concave in joint
e¤ort with decreasing returns to e¤ort and is specied as
p = p (e; a) = ea; +  < 1: (8)
VCs and entrepreneurs share expected rm value,
E = (1  ) [spV +B] ;
F = (1  ) [(1  s) pV  B   (1  z) I] ;
G =  [pV   (1  z) I]  zI;
 = E + F + G = pV   I;
(9)
where E; F ; G are expected incomes accruing to entrepreneurs, VCs and the govern-
ment. Note that  stands for a uniform capital gains tax on VCs and entrepreneurs.
The governments surplus corresponds to the net tax revenue extracted from the project.
3Selection problems are discussed in the literature originating with DeMeza and Webb (1987) and
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), see De Meza (2002) for a recent summary. Ueda (2003) specically investigates
project selection of VCs. Fuest et al. (2003) study the relation between selection problems and corporate
vs. personal taxes.
12
Since VC funds are owned by households, the share of aggregate VC surplus per capita
 fulls  = FE.
Let e¤ort costs of the entrepreneur and the VC be given by e and a, respectively.
In assuming competitive VCs, we allocate all bargaining power to the entrepreneur. Ac-
cordingly, the VCs surplus per venture, 
F  F   a, is squeezed to zero. Dene the
entrepreneurs prot net of e¤ort cost as 
E  E e which is uniform by our symmetry
assumption. An entrepreneurs net surplus from incurring the seed investment and start-
ing a business is then 
E   hi    1  tW W , as she must also take account of foregone
after-tax wage income and seed investment. When comparing expected welfare of the two
career alternatives, all terms common to all occupations such as  + T and consumer
surplus C fall out. Therefore, 
E   hi   1  tW W gives the true utility di¤erential be-
tween occupations. Having sunk
 
1  tW W + hi, she is left to maximize her remaining
surplus subject to the VC choosing to participate and subject to optimal e¤ort choice of
both parties after the contract is signed. The problem is

E = max
s;B
(1  ) [p (e; a) sV +B]  e s:t: (10)
PCF : 
F = (1  ) [p (e; a) (1  s)V  B   (1  z) I]  a  0; (i)
ICE : 
Ee = pe (e; a) (1  ) sV    = 0; (ii)
ICF : 
Fa = pa (e; a) (1  ) (1  s)V    = 0: (iii)
At e¤ort stage, where the agreed prot share s is already xed, optimal levels of e¤orts
are determined by the two incentive compatibility constraints. Figure 2 illustrates the
simultaneous choice of e¤ort, using the functional form for p(e; a) in (8). Both reaction
curves e(a) and a(e) are positively sloped, implying that entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC
advice are strategic complements. According to Figure 2, and proved more precisely in
the mathematical appendix, a larger expected IPO value boosts both the entrepreneurs
e¤ort and the VCs managerial support and thereby raises the rms survival chances. An
increase in the symmetric capital gains tax reduces the reward for e¤ort and yields the
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opposite e¤ects.
e
V­
a
( )e a
( )a e
t¯
t¬ V®
Figure 2: E¤ort and Advice
Anticipating e¤ort choices, the entrepreneur proposes a deal such that the VC is
willing to nance the investment expenditure and support the project with advice. The
entrepreneur can raise her own expected prot by keeping either a larger share s or
demanding a higher upfront payment B by asking for a price in excess of start-up cost
(1  z) I. Note a fundamental di¤erence between the two instruments s and B. Claiming
a higher s reduces the VCs share and destroys her incentives to add value, while the
upfront payment B does not. The latter merely redistributes lump-sum across the two
parties. The entrepreneur will therefore rst choose s to maximize joint surplus. Having
found this Pareto optimal share s, she then requests a maximum upfront payment B
that allows the VC no more than to break even. In this way, the entrepreneur acquires
the entire joint surplus 
 = 
E + 
F . Substituting B from (10.i) into (10) yields the
entrepreneurs problem for choosing s, anticipating the incentive e¤ects for later stage
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e¤ort e and a as determined by (10.ii-iii):



V
+
; 
 
; z
+

= max
s
(1  ) [p (e; a)V   (1  z) I]  a  e s.t. (10.ii-iii). (11)
With a symmetric capital gains tax on both entrepreneurs and VCs, the Pareto optimal
prot share s becomes independent of taxes and of venture returns V , as is shown in the
mathematical appendix. We can thus take s as a xed constant, beyond the inuence of
policy.4
The joint surplus must be su¢ ciently large to compensate entrepreneurs for any fore-
gone outside opportunity
 
1  tW W , and the initial e¤ort cost hi = h  i during the seed
phase prior to VC nance. Entry of entrepreneurs occurs as long as 
  1  tW W hi >
0, until the marginal entrepreneur just breaks even. The free entry condition is, thus,



V
+
; 
 
; z
+

=
 
1  tW W + hE: (12)
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between venture returns and the number of entrepreneurs.
A higher venture return V , consisting of a higher IPO value of a maturing rm, raises the
returns to start-up activity and leads more agents to choose an entrepreneurial career.
4In Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004a) we show, though, that di¤erential capital gains taxes on entrepre-
neurs and VCs, or a di¤erent tax treatment of the upfront payment B, can change the privately optimal
equity share s, leading to more complicated comparative statics. For example, if VCs are taxed more
heavily, it becomes more expensive for the team to rely on the VCs e¤ort. It is then optimal to raise the
share s and rely more on the entrepreneurs e¤ort.
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The other policy e¤ects are directly inferred from the Figure.
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Figure 3: Start-up Entrepreneurship
2.5 Equilibrium
We now derive the equilibrium value V of new rms. The demand for entrepreneurship
reects the demand D for second period goods which requires a su¢ ciently large number
N = pE of mature rms,
D = f (k)  pE: (13)
The success rate of start-ups is p (V; ) since e¤orts e; a are obviously functions of venture
returns and the capital gains tax on new rms (viz. 10.ii-iii and Figure 2). In turn, the
price of successful new rms is uniquely related to the interest rate and taxes as in (4).
Total di¤erentiation of (4) and using the derivatives given in (7) yields
dV =  V1 + (1  t) k
R
dR  V
1  t dt+
trk
R
d; V

R
 
; t
 
; 
+

: (14)
An increase in the interest rate makes rm values fall while a rise in the corporate income
tax or a reduction in tax depreciation likewise are associated with falling IPO prices.
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The supply per rm, f (k), and total market demand D both depend on the interest
rate. Knowing V , one can thus derive the demand for entrepreneurs by inverting the
equilibrium condition in (13),
ED

R
+
; t
+
; 
 
; 
+

=
1
p (V (R; t; ) ; )
 D (R)
f (k (R; t; ))
: (15)
The demand for start-up entrepreneurship is upward sloping in r (use f 0 (k) = u),
dED
dR
=
E
D
D0 (R)  E
f
u
dk
dR
  E
p
dp
dV
dV
dR
> 0: (16)
Since dp=dV and D0 are both positive, and dk=dR and dV=dR both negative, all com-
ponents contribute to a positive impact of the interest rate on the demand for start-up
entrepreneurship. There are altogether three e¤ects. First, a higher interest rate stimu-
lates demand for second period goods and thus the demand for entrepreneurship. Second,
a higher interest rate lowers investment in each mature rm, necessitating more rms to
start up to meet second period goods demand. Third, a higher interest rate reduces the
IPO price for successful new rms. Lower venture returns reduce the success rate of new
rms, so that more of them must start up to secure a given level of goods demand in the
second period. The upward sloping demand schedule in Figure 4 illustrates.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Venture Returns
17
Taxes shift the demand schedule for entrepreneurs. An increase in the corporate
income tax t lowers investment in all rms, necessitating more rms to meet demand.
Moreover, the higher tax lowers the price of successful new rms. This depresses e¤orts
and the probability of success of new rms so that more of them have to start up to meet
demand for second period goods. The opposite e¤ects can be registered for an increase
in the depreciation parameter . Finally, a higher capital gains tax  raises the demand
for entrepreneurship, since the tax reduces the returns to e¤ort and thus cuts into the
success rate, so that more rms must be created to satisfy any given demand for second
period output.
The supply schedule in Figure 4 slopes down. Since an increase in the interest rate
lowers venture returns, the entrepreneurs surplus
 is reduced, so that fewer entrepreneurs
nd it worthwhile to incur the seed investment hi as illustrated in Figure 3. More formally,
the free entry condition (12) yields
ES

R
 
; 
 
; z
+
; tW
+
; t
 
; 
+

;
dES
dR
=
1
h
 @

@V
dV
dR
< 0: (17)
Apart from the negative interest rate e¤ect on the supply of entrepreneurship, the cap-
ital gains tax likewise tends to reduce entrepreneurship on account of its negative e¤ect
on entrepreneurial surplus. In contrast, a higher start-up capital subsidy and a higher
wage tax both stimulate entrepreneurship, since they boost the surplus created by entre-
preneurial rms. Finally, the corporation tax subtracts from mature rm value V and
thereby the reward to entrepreneurship. Tax depreciation adds value and consequently
encourages start-up activity which shifts up the entrepreneurial supply schedule. The free
entry condition (12) and Figure 3 illustrate.
Equating demand and supply for entrepreneurship, ED = ES, yields the equilibrium
number of start-up rms and the venture return r which are uniquely tied to the IPO
price V . Figure 4 illustrates. The comparative statics are simply derived by graphical
arguments.
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2.6 Welfare
With risk neutrality and no distributional concerns, welfare is the sum of individual
utilities and reects e¢ ciency. Utility in (2) includes monetary prots  = FE from
ownership of VC rms. Since these prots are merely a compensation for intangible VC
e¤ort costs aE, we must subtract them. The welfare criterion is thus
U =
Z E
0
Uidi+ ULL  aE: (18)
Utility of a worker is UL =
 
1  tW W +  + T + C. Referring to (12) and noting
symmetry after the seed phase, utility of an entrepreneur is Ui = UE + hE   hi. Utility
of a low cost entrepreneur equals utility of the marginal one plus a rent reecting her cost
advantage in generating a business idea. Since the marginal entrepreneur is indi¤erent
with respect to occupational choice, UE = UL. Noting E + L = 1 as well as the
participation constraint of VCs, F = a, we can compute a simple welfare formula,
U =
 
1  tW W + T + C (R) + Z E
0
 
hE   hi di; C 0 (R) = D=R2: (19)
The last term reects the rents of low cost entrepreneurs. Further, consumer rent from
second period consumption increases with the interest rate.
Taking the di¤erential of (19) and using the government budget constraint yields the
welfare change relative to an untaxed initial equilibrium position. Detailed calculations
are found in the mathematical appendix, section C,
dU = (peV   )Ede+ (paV   )Eda: (20)
The coe¢ cients in (20) would be zero if e¤ort and advice were chosen at their rst
best levels. First best e¤orts follow from maximizing the joint surplus in (11) without
incentive constraints, and would satisfy the conditions peV =  and paV =  in the
absence of taxes. Since e¤orts are assumed not veriable and contractible, neither the
entrepreneur nor the VC is able to commit to rst best e¤ort, but will choose their inputs
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according to the incentive constraints (10.ii-iii). Since both agents must share the return
on their e¤ort within the team, but must fully bear their own cost, entrepreneurial e¤ort
and VC advice are too low in the private equilibrium.5 Even small taxes can thus give
rise to rst order welfare changes. Comparing with (10.ii-iii), the round brackets in (20)
are both found to be positive. They reect the excess of social over private returns to
e¤ort and advice. Since privately chosen e¤ort tends to be underprovided in the presence
of double moral hazard, any policy that boosts e¤ort and advice must yield rst order
welfare gains.
3 Policy and the Venture Capital Sector
The European Venture Capital Association has recently benchmarked European countries
with respect to their business climate for young VC nanced rms, assessing among other
things the levels of corporate taxes, especially for small and medium-sized companies,
capital income taxes of personal investments in new rms, and scal subsidies to start-up
investments (cfr. EVCA, 2004). Clearly, the VC industry regards taxes as an obstacle
to VC nanced start-up activity. It also seems to suggest that subsidies to loans or to
physical investments in new rms would be desirable. However, our analysis casts doubt
on this conclusion. Although successful in boosting the rate of business creation, start-
up subsidies may a¤ect the quality of VC backed entrepreneurship quite unfavorably.
Furthermore, a limited focus on the taxation of small rms cuts too short. The taxation
of mature rms might be as important for start-ups as the direct taxation of infant
companies. The corporate income tax may well reduce entrepreneurship even though the
tax is only paid by mature companies rather than young ones. The basic insight is that by
reducing the value of mature rms, the corporate tax diminishes the gains from setting
up new companies as well. Finally, the taxation of wages is also relevant for start-up
activity, since it direcly impacts on the entrepreneursalternative career opportunities.
5Such incentive problems in teams have been rst analyzed by Holmstrom (1982).
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The model set up in the preceding section is well suited to study how scal policy might
a¤ect the joint e¤orts of entrepreneurs and VCs in new rms, the success probability of
these, the level of entrepreneurship, venture returns, and welfare. Table 1 provides an
overview of the main results. We emphasize intuitive explanations in the main text. For
a more formal analysis of the proposed policy experiments, the reader is referred to the
mathematical appendix.
Type of tax R E N V e a U
mature rms
corporate tax#) t       
tax depreciation#)  + + + + + + +
young rms
capital gains tax        
start-up subsidy z + + +    
occupational choice
wage tax tW + + +    
Note: R interest factor, E young rms, N mature
rms, V value of mature rm, e entrepreneurial ef-
fort, a venture capital advice, U welfare.
#) The change in the interest rate is unambiguous.
A su¢ cient condition for the other comparative sta-
tic results is 0  .
Table 1: E¤ects of Tax Policy
3.1 Corporate Taxation
The e¤ects of taxes are best understood in terms of demand and supply curves for en-
trepreneurial rms. The supply side reects occupational choice of entrepreneurs. An
increase in the corporate tax directly reduces the value of a mature rm which dimin-
ishes the entrepreneurssurplus from creating a new one. Fewer entrepreneurs will want
to incur the opportunity costs and give up alternative wages. Accordingly, the supply
curve in Figure 4 shifts down. For any given interest rate, which determines the size of
the output market, the demand for entrepreneurship follows from the number of rms N
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needed to supply the market, D = f (k)N . A rst policy e¤ect derives from its impact
on rm size which changes the number of mature rms needed to supply a given mar-
ket. Since the corporate tax impairs expansion investment and thereby erodes output
per mature rm, a larger number N of rms is needed to serve the market which creates
demand for entrepreneurship. Since only a fraction p of new companies actually mature
to production stage, N = pE, the number of young rms must necessarily be larger than
the mass of established businesses which gives rise to a second supply e¤ect. Since the
corporate tax diminishes the IPO price equal to the value of a mature rm, it erodes the
incentives for entrepreneurial e¤ort and managerial advice and leads to an increased rate
of business failure. Everything else equal, more new rms must be started for any given
mass of mature rms serving the demand for second period output. Both e¤ects shift up
the demand schedule in Figure 4.
To eliminate the resulting excess demand for entrepreneurship, the interest rate must
fall. Along the supply curve, entrepreneurship picks up, since a lower interest raises
mature rm value which creates a larger surplus from business creation and thereby
attracts more entrepreneurs to set up their own rm. Turning to the demand side, we nd
that a lower interest depresses savings and demand for second period output. Moreover,
a lower interest boosts expansion investment, making mature rms bigger and thereby
requiring fewer of them to serve the market. Further, the increased rm value boosts
joint e¤ort and thereby survival rates so that fewer start-ups are needed for any given
number of mature rms. All three e¤ects, i.e. smaller market, bigger mature rms, and a
higher survival rate of young rms, add up to reduce demand for entrepreneurship along
the demand curve. Apparently, the equilibrium e¤ect on entrepreneurship seems to be
ambiguous when both curves shift as illustrated in Figure 4. In the appendix (Keuschnigg
and Nielsen, 2004c) we derive a su¢ cient condition for the net e¤ect to be negative as
stated in Table 1. The corporate tax reduces entrepreneurship if the tax is neutral with
respect to expansion investment ( = 1), or if the interest elasticity of (second period)
output demand 0 exceeds the elasticity  of capital demand per rm with respect to the
user cost, 0  . In Figure 4, a large 0 implies that any given interest increase triggers
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a large increase in market size, leading to a steep slope of the demand schedule. A small
capital demand elasticity  leads to a relatively smaller upwards shift of the demand curve.
It can thus be illustrated graphically that this condition works to erode entrepreneurship
following an increase in the corporate income tax.
A falling interest rate boosts rm value, while a higher tax reduces it. The direct tax
e¤ect dominates to reduce the value of a mature rm and thereby diminishes the returns
to e¤ort during the start-up phase. In consequence, entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC support
are discouraged which contributes to a higher rate of business failure. The corporate tax
thereby leads to a rst order welfare loss since e¤orts are already too low and the rate of
business failure too high in the market equilibrium. This rst order welfare loss is much
more severe than the tax distortion of mature rm investment which results only in a
second order welfare loss that would disappear for small taxes. We summarize:
Proposition 1 (Corporate Tax on Mature Firms) (a) The corporate income tax
reduces market size and the equilibrium interest rate. The next results hold unambiguously
if  = 1, and hold under the su¢ cient condition 0   if  < 1: (b) The corporate
tax decreases the number of start-up and mature rms and lowers rm value. (c) It
impairs incentives for e¤ort and advice and reduces the success probability. (d) A small
tax increase entails a rst order welfare loss.
The tax allowance , i.e. the share of investment outlays immediately deductible from
the current tax base, allows us to portray di¤erent systems of corporate income taxation.
Note that we have assumed full depreciation of capital in each production period. Setting
the tax allowance to zero corresponds to a Schanz-Haig-Simons corporate income tax with
tax depreciation equal to economic depreciation in the second period, see section 2.3. In
contrast, immediate expensing of investment outlays corresponding to  = 1 represents
a cash ow tax. Having undertaken an immediate write-o¤ prevents, of course, further
tax depreciation in the second period when capital actually depreciates economically.
The cash ow tax is well known to be neutral with respect to investment, resulting in
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a marginal e¤ective tax rate on expansion investment equal to zero. In this case, the
user cost of capital in (4) exclusively depends on the rate of interest but is independent
of the tax rate. However, the average e¤ective tax rate of the cash ow tax (i.e. the
share of corporate income paid in tax) is strictly greater than zero. Notwithstanding the
neutrality of the cash ow tax with respect to marginal expansion investment, the tax
burden is capitalized in a lower rm value. In reducing the IPO price, the cash ow
tax does distort against discrete start-up investment. It also impairs the incentives of
entrepreneurs and VCs to engage in their rms and thereby contributes to more frequent
business failure. Given that joint e¤orts are already too low from a social perspective,
the cash ow tax diminishes welfare and e¢ ciency.
Of course, investment expensing is valuable only if the tax rate is positive already.
Starting from this situation, we now consider an increase in the tax allowance  which
corresponds to a move towards a cash ow tax. A more generous allowance promotes
expansion investment and, by reducing the average e¤ective tax rate, boosts rm value.
Given a larger value to be realized at IPO, entrepreneurs can expect a larger surplus from
business creation and will accordingly start businesses more often. In consequence, the
supply schedule in Figure 4 for young entrepreneurial rms shifts up. At the same time,
the expectation of larger IPO values invigorates the joint e¤ort in the start-up phase and
contributes to improved survival rates. With higher survival chances, fewer rms need to
be started for any given number of them to mature to production stage. The increased
tax allowance further raises expansion investment and production in mature rms which
likewise reduces the demand for entrepreneurship. The demand schedule in Figure 4 thus
moves down for both reasons.
Obviously, to eliminate the resulting net supply of entrepreneurial rms, the interest
rate must rise to force exit. Although a higher interest rates erodes rm values, it does
not overturn the positive direct e¤ect of the tax allowance. A higher IPO value boosts
the return to e¤ort and also encourages the VC to advise more intensively. Start-up rms
accordingly benet from this extra e¤ort in terms of improved survival chances. Given
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that joint e¤ort is too low initially, the tax allowance results in a rst order welfare gain.
Finally, the rate of business creation and the number of mature rms result from o¤setting
inuences. First, the higher equilibrium interest rate reects larger market size due to
higher demand for second period output which expands the demand for both types of
rms. Second, the tax allowance boosts marginal investments and makes mature rms
bigger. The market supports a smaller number of them which negatively feeds back on
the rate of business creation as well. The analysis in the appendix nds the net e¤ect to
be positive. Third, given that start-ups are more likely to mature to production stage,
fewer of them are needed for any given number of rms on the product market. Again,
the appendix reports a net positive e¤ect.
Proposition 2 (Tax Allowance for Expansion Investment) (a) With a corporate
tax in place, a more generous tax allowance for expansion investment raises equilibrium
interest and boosts market size. The next results hold unter the su¢ cient condition 0  :
(b) The tax allowance boosts rm values and raises the number of young and mature rms.
(c) In raising rm values, the allowance sharpens incentives for e¤ort and advice and
boosts the success probability. (d) By raising IPO values, the tax allowance stimulates
e¤ort and leads to rst order welfare gains.
3.2 Capital Gains Taxes and New Firms
The immediate e¤ect of a capital gains tax on young rms, given expected IPO values
V , is to subtract from returns to e¤ort and advice. The tax does not directly a¤ect
mature rm value which is exclusively determined by corporate taxes and the market
interest rate. As illustrated in Figure 2, the tax discourages entrepreneurial e¤ort and
managerial advice and consequently results in a higher failure rate among start-up rms.
The increased risk a¤ects both the supply and demand schedules for entrepreneurship.
In reducing the expected surplus from entrepreneurship, fewer agents nd it worthwhile
to start their own rm. The supply curve thus shifts down as indicated in Figure 4. On
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the demand side, the tax has no direct impact on market size and expansion investment
of mature rms. However, on account of the reduced success probability of young rms,
more entrepreneurs are required for any given number of rms to mature to production
stage. The demand curve thus shifts up.
In face of the emerging excess demand for entrepreneurship, the interest rate must fall
to reestablish equilibrium. The lower interest rate leads to lower savings and second period
demand for goods, shrinks the market size. It also encourages mature rm investment
and boosts rm values which, in turn, stimulate the returns to joint e¤ort in the start-up
phase. For all three reasons, smaller market size, larger mature rms, and a higher survival
rate among start-ups, the demand for new rms falls along the demand curve and reduces
entrepreneurship. The increase in rm values on the other hand boosts entrepreneurial
surplus and stimulates the supply of new entrepreneurs along the supply curve. The
net e¤ect on the equilibrium number of start-up entrepreneurs remains ambiguous. The
ambiguity arises despite the tax leading to a smaller number of mature rms. Mature
rms also grow bigger since the falling interest rate spurs expansion investment. More
entrepreneurs might nevertheless be needed since a lower success rate requires more start-
ups for enough of them to mature to production stage.
While the tax discourages joint e¤ort for any given IPO value V , the falling interest
rate raises mature rm value and thereby sharpens incentives for e¤ort. The appendix
(see Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2004c) shows that this price adjustment cannot dominate
over the direct tax e¤ect, implying lower e¤ort and VC support and, hence, a lower success
rate in equilibrium. By (20), the reduction in entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC support leads
to a welfare loss.
Proposition 3 (Capital Gains Tax on Start-up Firms) (a) A symmetric capital
gains tax reduces the interest rate and market size. (b) On account of a lower rate of
interest, the tax boosts mature rm value, raises expansion investment but reduces the
number of mature rms. The change in the number of start-up rms is ambiguous. (c)
26
The tax impairs incentives for e¤ort and advice and reduces the survival probability. (d)
Introducing a small capital gains tax on start-up rms entails a rst order welfare loss.
A corollary of this proposition is that a small negative capital gains tax or a revenue
subsidy for young rms will encourage e¤ort and VC support and thereby contribute to
higher welfare. However, a possible tax break in capital gains taxation must be limited
to young VC backed rms only. We have also assumed full loss o¤set in capital gains
taxation. The results on the capital gains tax are robust to restrictions on loss o¤set.
Interestingly, the loss o¤set limitation can itself strengthen incentives for VC support in
that the tax penalty arising from a limited loss o¤set makes business failure more costly
(Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003b).
3.3 A Subsidy to the Cost of Capital
Most real world policies to encourage business creation allow for interest subsidies, loan
guarantees to facilitate access to cheaper bank loans, or direct subsidies to investment
spending. All these measures subsidize the cost of capital and are largely unrelated
to rm performance. They can thus be understood as a subsidy to the cost of start-
up investment, captured by z in our model. The only direct e¤ect of an increase in the
investment subsidy is to raise the entrepreneurs surplus from starting the rm and thereby
to encourage entry, see (11) and (17). There are no other direct e¤ects neither on e¤ort
and advice nor on the demand for start-up rms. In Figure 4, the subsidy thus shifts up
the supply schedule, creating excess supply of entrepreneurs. The adjustment mechanism
is well known by now. The interest rate must rise to stimulate savings and demand for
second period output which leads to more demand for mature and young rms. At the
same time, the increase in interest erodes rm value and entrepreneurial surplus which
cuts back on entry and supply of new rms. The new equilibrium is characterized by a
higher interest rate, larger market size and supports a larger number of entrepreneurs and
mature rms. The higher interest retards mature rm investment and erodes rm values,
see Table 1.
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The undesirable side e¤ect of start-up subsidies is that they impair incentives for
entrepreneurial e¤ort and VC advice. The success probability correspondingly declines.
The more successful these subsidies are in stimulating entry, the more likely should be
the decline in venture returns and the stronger the negative welfare consequences. Note,
however, that the welfare loss results from a general equilibrium e¤ect rather than any
direct impact. In a small open economy with a xed interest rate, mature rm value should
remain constant. In this case, the incentives for joint e¤ort would remain untarnished and
the subsidy would only produce increased entry. Since the entry margin is not distorted,
the subsidy would entail a zero welfare e¤ect in this case.6
Proposition 4 (Capital Subsidy to Start-ups) (a) A subsidy to start-up capital cost
raises the interest rate and expands market size. (b) The subsidy expands the number of
young and mature rms but erodes mature rm value. (c) It impairs incentives for e¤ort
and VC advice and reduces the survival rate. (d) Introducing a small subsidy entails a
rst order welfare loss.
The fact that a start-up subsidy and the capital gains tax both reduce welfare suggests
the following strategy that would countribute to a more active VC industry but yet avoid
any high cost to the general tax payer. Impose a tax z < 0 on start-up investment cost
and use the proceeds to nance a narrow tax break  < 0 on capital gains to young VC
backed rms. Since the entrepreneur is wealth-constrained, the start-up tax must be paid
by the VC who should have no di¢ culty in raising capital and who will share the revenue
subsidy with the entrepreneur when the venture succeeds. Being self-nanced, the policy
provides a net tax or subsidy equal to zero. A small start-up tax thus nances a cut in
the capital gains tax rate by (pV   I) d = Idz.
Consider rst the direct impact for a given mature rm value V .7 The direct e¤ects
6Assuming a xed interest as in a small open economy would not change the qualitative results of
propositions 1 and 2 which do not hinge on the general equilibrium e¤ects on the interest rate.
7For a more formal exposition of the e¤ects of the self-nancing policy we refer to Keuschnigg and
Nielsen (2004a).
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on entrepreneurial surplus from the investment tax and from the revenue subsidy exactly
cancel out because the policy is constructed to be self-nancing. However, the tax break
on  strengthens incentives, thereby boosting joint e¤ort as illustrated in Figure 2, and
consequently increases the success rate as well. As a result, the project surplus increases
and encourages entry of entrepreneurial rms. The supply schedule in Figure 4 shifts up.
At the same time and for any given V , the tax cut  reduces the demand for entrepreneur-
ship because it makes start-ups more successful by inducing more e¤ort, see (15). Fewer
rms are needed to satisfy goods demand if more of them mature to the production stage.
The demand schedule shifts down. The equilibrium e¤ect on entrepreneurship remains
ambiguous, but the interest rate goes up to close the gap between demand and supply.
Furthermore, it is easily shown that net venture values (1  )V increase on account of
the tax cut. Accordingly, the self-nancing policy stimulates joint e¤ort and raises the
survival rate in equilibrium as well. Again from (20), this brings about an improvement
in welfare.8
Our framework hence essentially implies that public policy should not aim at more,
but at more successful VC backed rms. Policy should not aim at the volume but at
the quality of VC investments. This conforms quite well with the conclusions of Bottazzi
and Da Rin (2002) and Hege et al. (2003) about VC in Europe. They argue that in
Europe VC has expanded quite impressively over the last decade, but the impact on rm
performance seemingly remained rather limited. If anything, this calls for a policy that
sharpens incentives for more entrepreneurial e¤ort and more active VC involvement. In
our framework, the entry margin is undistorted, but the double moral hazard between
entrepreneurs and VCs works to erode incentives for value creating e¤ort. While in many
countries current policy vis-a-vis start-up rms essentially consists in a series of subsidies
to investment in these rms, coupled with taxation of capital gains, our analysis suggest
that a combination of scaling down these subsidies while alleviating taxation of capital
gains on VC backed investments would be benecial.
8Note that the policy would work even better in an open economy where any adjustment in the interest
rate and mature rm value is limited.
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3.4 Wage Taxation
The rate of business creation depends not only on the surplus created by new entrepre-
neurial rms but also on the entrepreneursalternative career prospects. For this reason,
wage taxation is quite relevant for start-up activity as the empirical literature mentioned
in the introduction emphasizes. The implications of wage taxation in our model are easily
inferred. The wage tax exclusively inuences the occupational choice decision. In reduc-
ing the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship, it stimulates entry of new entrepreneurs and
thereby shifts up the supply schedule in Figure 4. To equilibrate demand and supply of
new entrepreneurial rms, the interest rate must rise. The higher interest rate presses
down the value of new rms at IPO. Lower venture returns, in turn, hurt e¤ort and advice
in start-up rms, harm their survival prospects and ultimately reduce welfare. The e¤ects
are qualitatively identical to the capital cost subsidy.
Proposition 5 (Wage Tax) (a) An increasing wage tax raises the interest rate and
expands market size. (b) The tax expands entrepreneurship and the number of mature
rms but erodes rm value. (c) It impairs incentives for e¤ort and advice and reduces the
survival probability. (d) Introducing a small wage tax leads to a rst order welfare loss.
As a corollary, a subsidy to wage income would restrict entry, leading to fewer rms
with higher values. The subsidy could raise welfare since increased rm values sharpen
incentives for joint e¤ort. The start-up investment tax in the preceding subsection and
the wage subsidy in this subsection can be compared to DeMeza and Webb (1987) who
argue, for entirely di¤erent reasons, that entrepreneurial entry should be discouraged.
4 Conclusions
This chapter has proposed an equibrium model of the venture capital industry and has
investigated the consequences and appropriateness of scal policy for the quality and
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quantity of venture capital nanced entrepreneurship. Such an analysis is important
for several reasons. First, the creation of young entrepreneurial rms is a signicant
factor in promoting employment and innovation in a growing economy. Second, venture
capital has become an increasingly important source of nance for start-up rms over
the last decades in virtually all industrial countries. In combining nancing of new rms
with active advice and networking support, venture capital can importantly help the
professionalization of their portfolio companies and add value to the investments. For this
reason, venture capital backed rms tend to outperform similar rms without access to
venture capital, making them a particularly important source of job growth and innovation
in the economy. Third, the business community at large as well as the venture capital
industry itself have repeatedly questioned whether existing public policies are su¢ ciently
conducive to the development of start-ups rms. For instance, the European Venture
Capital and Private Equity Association has twice issued a benchmarking report on the
conditions for entrepreneurship in its member countries, pointing to the importance of
scal subsidies to research and development and other early stage investment cost as well
as corporate income taxes and taxes on capital gains accruing to individuals from their
stakes in entrepreneurial rms.
Rather than simply arguing for high subsidies and low taxes to stimulate entrepre-
neurship, as is often done, a stringent theoretical framework is called for in order to
appropriately assess the role of relevant taxes and subsidies in determining the level and
quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship and economic e¢ ciency. We have pro-
posed a structural equilibrium model of the venture capital industry that emphasizes the
need for outside risk capital and points to the importance of incentive problems that
entrepreneurs and nanciers may face in a typical, innovative start-up company. With
this formal framework at hand, we have derived some important policy implications. Our
results imply that the taxation of capital gains derived from young rms may be quite
harmful to the quality of venture capital nanced entrepreneurship and may diminish
welfare.
31
Perhaps surprisingly, corporate taxes are not only harmful to the expansion investment
and value of mature rms but could be equally harmful to start-up rms which have not
yet begun to actually pay the tax. In reducing mature rm value to be realized at the
end of the start-up phase, the corporate tax impairs the incentives of entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists for e¤ort and active advice at the early stage of the rms development.
It may therefore contribute to an overly high failure rate and harm the quality of venture
capital backed rms. Most of the real world programs to stimulate business creation
involves a subsidy to the cost of capital in one or the other form. However, since these
subsidies are given early on and are not success-related, they are not useful for sharpening
incentives for e¤ort and advice. Because they boost the rate of business creation, they
may actually reduce equilibrium venture returns and thereby discourage e¤ort and advice
within VC backed start-ups. When reducing the quality of entrepreneurship this way,
investment subsidies may turn out to be quite undesirable.
Our insights on the role of taxes and subsidies shows that they can be combined in
a self-nancing way to improve the quality of venture capital investments. Instead of
a subsidy, a tax on start-up capital cost is proposed with the revenue used to nance
a selective tax cut on the capital gains derived from venture capital backed investment.
This package replaces a non-performance related subsidy with a success related tax cut,
sharpens incentives within start-up rms and should thereby contribute to a more active
style of venture capital nancing.
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5 Mathematical Appendix
This mathematical appendix derives comparative static and other results.
A E¤ort, Advice and Prot Sharing
E¤ort and advice are simultaneously determined as illustrated in Figure 2. To obtain
the comparative static e¤ects, we log-linearize the incentive constraints at an initial equi-
librium position. The hat notation indicates a percentage change x^ = dx=x relative to
the initial value x. For tax rates which can be zero at the initial equilibrium, we use
the relative change of the tax price, [1   =  d= (1  )   ^ . The functional form
for the likelihood of success in (8) thus implies p^ = e^ + a^, p^e =   (1  ) e^ + a^, and
p^a = e^  (1  ) a^. The linearized incentive constraints (10.ii-iii) are
ICE : (1  ) e^ = a^+ s^+ V^   ^ ;
ICF : (1  ) a^ = e^  s
1 s s^+ V^   ^ :
(A.1)
Solving the system (A.1) for e¤ort response yields
a^ = 1
1  
h
V^   ^   s 
1 s s^
i
;
e^ = 1
1  
h
V^   ^ + 1 s 
1 s s^
i
;
p^ = a^+ e^ = +
1  

V^   ^

+ (1 s) s
(1  )(1 s) s^:
(A.2)
Next we show that the prot share which is optimally chosen as in (11), is independent
of policy parameters. The rst order condition is
d

ds
= 0 : [(1  )V  epe   e]  e^=s^+ [(1  )V  apa   a]  a^=s^ = 0: (A.3)
Exploiting epe = p and apa = p by (8), we nd (10.ii-iii) to be equivalent to e =
(1  ) pV s and a = (1  )pV (1  s). Substituting these relations together with
the results in (A.2) into (A.3) yields after cancelling some terms (1  s) (1  s  )  =
(s  ) s, or
s =
1
2
+
1
2
  
(1  ) s
2: (A.4)
The Pareto-optimal prot share is independent of any other variables except for the
elasticities  and  that determine the e¤ect of the two inputs on the success rate, p^ =
e^ + a^. If both types of e¤ort are equally e¤ective in raising the rms success rate,
then (A.4) shows that the optimal prot share is s = :5 for  = . A simple graphical
solution of (A.4) shows that the entrepreneurs share is chosen larger than a half if the
rms success rate depends relatively more on the entrepreneurs e¤ort, s > :5 for  > .
If the VCs input is more important, the joint interest is to rely relatively more on the
VCs input and therefore allocating a larger share to the VC, leading to s < :5 for  < .
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B Equilibrium
B.1 Supply of New Firms
To obtain the linearized supply curve as implied by (12), take the di¤erential of (11):
d
 = (1  ) pV V^   (1  ) [pV   (1  z) I] ^ + (1  ) (1  z) Iz^
+ [(1  ) epeV   e] e^+ [(1  ) apaV   a] a^:
By the same steps used in deriving (A.4), the last terms emerge as (1  ) pV (1  s) e^
and (1  )pV sa^. Substituting (A.2) with s^ = 0 on account of (A.4) gives
d

1   = pV	V^   [pV	  (1  z) I] ^ + (1  z) Iz^; 	 =
1  s  (1  s)
1     > 1: (B.1)
Equations (11-12) show that pV   (1  z) I must necessarily be positive, as otherwise the
joint surplus would not cover the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship in (12). Since
	 > 1, the coe¢ cient of the capital gains tax rate ^ is positive a fortiori. Thus, (B.1)
establishes the signs of the joint surplus as noted in (11).
By (12), the surplus drives entry according to d
 = hEE^   (1  tW )Wt^W . Equating
with (B.1), the linearized supply schedule for start-ups is
^hE
1   E^ = pV	V^   [pV	  (1  z) I] ^ + (1  z) Iz^ +
1  tW
1   W t^
W : (B.2)
The IPO value of a newly established rm in (4) is stated in (14) in di¤erential form.
Dene R^  dR=R, ^  d, t^  dt=(1  t) and express it in relative changes,
V^ =  V1 + (1  t) k
V
R^   t^+ trk
RV
^: (B.3)
Substituting (B.3) into (B.2) yields the supply schedule in terms of the rate of return on
new ventures,
hE
1  E^
S =   [V1 + (1  t) k] p	R^   pV	t^+ trkR p	^
  [pV	  (1  z) I] ^ + (1  z) Iz^ + 1 tW
1  Wt^
W :
(B.4)
This establishes the signs of the supply schedule, ES

R
 
; 
 
; z
+
; tW
+
; t
 
; 
+

.
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B.2 Demand for New Firms
Demand for capital in (6) depends on the cost of capital. Denoting the elasticity of capital
demand by  gives the second period output response of a mature rm,
k^ =   
(1  t) f 0
h
(1  t)RR^ + (1  ) rt^  tr^
i
; f^ =
kf 0
f
 k^;     f
0
kf 00
> 0: (B.5)
Turning to the demand side as given by u0 (D) = 1=R, we denote the price elasticity of
second period consumption by 0. Output demand thus depends on the interest rate as
D^ = 0R^; 0    u
0 (D)
Du00 (D)
> 0: (B.6)
The output market condition (13) is linearized as D^ = f^ + p^+ E^D. Using (A.2) for p^
and substituting the previous results leads to
E^D = R^ +
(1  ) rk
(1  t) f t^ 
trk
(1  t) f ^  
+ 
1    

V^   ^

;
where  is dened by
  0 + (1  t) Rk
(1  t) f : (B.7)
It is the demand elasticity for entrepreneurship with respect to the rate of interest r. Sub-
stituting (B.3) and collecting terms nally results in the demand schedule ED

R
 
; 
 
; t
+
; 
+

,
with elasticities according to
E^D =
h
 + +
1  
V1+(1 t)k
V
i
R^ +
h
(1 )rk
(1 t)f +
+
1   
i
t^
 
h

(1 t)f +
+
1  
1
RV
i
trk^ + +
1   ^ :
(B.8)
B.3 Equilibrium Venture Returns
The equilibrium e¤ects of policy interventions on venture returns follow upon equating
demand and supply of start-up rms. Knowing how venture returns change in equilibrium,
the e¤ects on entrepreneurship can be read from either the demand or the supply schedule.
Multiply (B.8) with hE= (1  ) and equate with (B.4). After some tedious manipulations,
R^ =  
h
(1 )rk
(1 t)f +
+
1   

hE
1  +	pV  
i
 t^
+trk
h

(1 t)f +
+
1  
1
RV

hE
1  +
	p
R
i
 ^
   +
1  
hE
1  +	pV   (1  z) I
  ^ + (1  z) I  z^ + 1 tW
1  W  t^W ;
 

 + +
1  
V1+(1 t)k
V

hE
1  + [V1 + (1  t) k] p	 > 0:
(B.9)
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All coe¢ cients are unambiguously signed by previous arguments. This equation proves
the graphic illustration of the comparative static results.
A key variable to be known for the welfare results is rm value. Multiplying (B.3)
by  and substituting (B.9) into (B.3) yields, after tedious arrangements using again 
to simplify. To obtain the coe¢ cient of ^, we have also replaced  = 0 +
(1 t)Rk
(1 t)f and
V1 =
(1 t)(f uk)
R
in (4) to write    RV1
(1 t)f = 0    + uk=f (k).
V^ =  
h
   (1 )rk
(1 t)f
V1+(1 t)k
V
i
hE
1  t^+
h
0    + ukf(k)
i
hE
1 
trk
RV
^
+ V1+(1 t)k
V
h 
+
1  
hE
1  +	pV   (1  z) I

^   (1  z) Iz^   1 tW
1  Wt^
W
i
:
(B.10)
Hence, 0   is a su¢ cient condition for ^ to raise rm values. The same condition is
su¢ cient to sign the e¤ect on t^, see (D.3) below.
For the capital gains tax, we compute


V^   ^

=  


hE
1   + (1  z) I
V1 + (1  t) k
V

^ < 0: (B.11)
C Welfare
To compute general equilibrium welfare results, we need to state the government budget
constraint. To this end, it will be useful to relate the present value of the corporate tax
base to private rm value V . Manipulating (4) eventually results in
f1   k + f   (1  ) k
R
=
V
1  t +
(1  ) rk
(1  t)R =
V  
1  t ; (C.1)
where the last equality uses the denition of   in (7). The present value T = T1+T2=R of
spending on transfers must be covered by the present value of tax revenue net of subsidies
to businesses. Note that there are E start-ups paying capital gains taxes but only N = pE
mature rms paying corporate taxes. The scal constraint is
T = tWWL+ t
 V
1  tpE +  [pV   (1  z) I]E   zIE: (C.2)
We consider small welfare e¤ects relative to an untaxed equilibrium. The welfare
e¤ects follow from the di¤erential of (19). Use the equilibrium condition D = f  pE as
well as the specication of inventive ability hi = h  i,
dU = dT  WdtW + fpE
R
dR
R
+ EhdE: (C.3)
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Starting from an untaxed equilibrium, one must evaluate all derivatives at a position
with zero taxes and subsidies. Occupational choice according to (12) implies hdE =
d
 +WdtW . Taking the di¤erential of (11) yields
hdE = pdV   (pV   I) d + Idz +WdtW + (peV   ) de+ (paV   ) da: (C.4)
Replace dV with the untaxed version of (14) which emerges, taking account of V1 =
f
R
  k in (4), as dV =   f
R
dR
R
  V dt. Substitute this into (C.3) and the result into (C.2):
dU = dT  WLdtW    pV Edt  (pV   I)Ed + IEdz
+(peV   )Ede+ (paV   )Eda:
(C.5)
For small deviations from an untaxed equilibrium, the rst ve terms will cancel. This is
immediately seen by taking the di¤erential of (C.2) at the zero tax position. Given the
absence of tax base e¤ects, rst taxing the private sector and then rebating tax revenues
as lump-sum transfers is merely a zero sum redistribution without any net loss. The rst
order e¢ ciency gains or losses of such policy intervention is thus seen in the second line
of (C.5).
D Output and Entrepreneurship
We characterize the real e¤ects of VC backed investment in several steps.
Industry Output: Demand for second period output denes the overall industry size
D = f (k) pE which is the output per rm f (k) times the number N = pE of successful
start-ups that actually survived to production stage. Overall industry output changes in
proportion to equilibrium venture returns and is given in (B.6), D^ = 0R^.
Number of Mature Firms: The number of mature rms N = pE is related to the
interest rate by substituting (B.3) into (A.2) and combining the result with (B.8),
N^ =   R^ + (1  ) rk
(1  t) f t^ 

(1  t) f trk  ^: (D.1)
Policy a¤ects rm size only with corporate taxation, depending on the tax rate t and the
investment allowance . Other policy variables can a¤ect mature rm size only via their
impact on the (gross) rate of interest R. Comparing (D.1) and (B.9) reveals an ambiguity,
since the direct e¤ect of corporate taxes runs counter to the indirect e¤ect via the interest
rate. Substituting the relevant parts of (B.9) into (D.1) yields
N^ =  
h
   (1 )rk
(1 t)f
V1+(1 t)k
V
i 
+
1  
hE
1  +	pV
  t^
+
h
   R[V1+(1 t)k]
(1 t)f
i 
+
1  
hE
1  +	pV

trk
RV
 ^:
(D.2)
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The apparent ambiguity enters because of the e¤ects on rm size. The tax allowance 
raises equilibrium returns in (B.9) and thereby expands market size. However, in spurring
mature rm investment, it makes each rm larger, leaving fewer rms to serve the market.
To resolve the ambiguity, substitute   0 + (1 t)kR(1 t)f and use V1 = (1 t)[f(k) uk]R from
(4) into the coe¢ cient of ^. The coe¢ cient t^ is rewritten using   = 1 + (1 )rk
RV
and
V1 + (1  t) k = (1 t)f+(1 )tkR from (4):
^ :    R[V1+(1 t)k]
(1 t)f = 0    + ukf ;
t^ :    (1 )rk
(1 t)f
V1+(1 t)k
V
=  + (1 )rk
RV
h
0    + k (1 t)r+1 t(1 t)f
i
:
(D.3)
A su¢ cient condition for the tax allowance to boost the number of mature rms is 0 >.
The corporate tax unambiguously reduces the number of mature rms in case of  = 1
when it is neutral with respect to expansion investment. When  falls, i.e. investment
expensing becomes less generous, the tax retards expansion investment. The consequent
reduction of output per rm demands a larger number of rms to serve the market. As
for the sign of ^, a su¢ cient condition for the sign to remain robust is 0 > .
Start-up Entrepreneurship: The policy impact on entrepreneurship is necessarily
more ambigous since there is an extra policy inuence on the success probability via the
impact on joint e¤ort. In Figure 4, t; ;  shift both the demand and supply schedules.
Since the wage tax and start-up subsidy have unambigous e¤ects in Figure 4, we do not
need to consider them here. The policy e¤ects follow upon substituting (B.9) into the
linearized demand curve. Some tedious steps result in
E^=^ =   [	pV   (1  z) I] + +
1  
V1+(1 t)k
V
(1  z) I ? 0;
E^=t^ =  
h
   (1 )rk
(1 t)f
V1+(1 t)k
V
i
 pV	;
E^=^ =
h
   R[V1+(1 t)k]
(1 t)f
i
 trk p	
R
:
(D.4)
The coe¢ cients for t and  involve the same proportional factors that were discussed in
(D.2-3) to sign the comparative static e¤ect. Obviously, the di¤erence in the e¤ects on
the number of mature and start-up rms stems from the additional change in the success
rate. Corporate taxation does not directly a¤ect e¤orts except via its inuence on rm
value, thereby yielding the same qualitative e¤ects as in (D.2).
The capital gains tax, however, has a direct negative impact on e¤ort and survival
probability which introduces an unresolved ambiguity in the number of start-ups. The
tax reduces interest and, thus, contracts industry size and the number of mature rms
which, for any given failure rate, also calls for fewer start-ups. With a higher failure rate,
more rms need to be started for any given number of them to arrive on the product
market. The net e¤ect is ambiguous.
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